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Abstract—This paper investigates the role of the eavesdrop-
per’s statistics in the implementation of a practical secret-key gen-
eration system. We carefully conduct the information-theoretic
analysis of a secret-key generation system from wireless channel
gains measured with software-defined radios. In particular, we
show that it is inaccurate to assume that the eavesdropper
gets no information because of decorrelation with distance. We
also provide a bound for the achievable secret-key rate in the
finite key-length regime that takes into account the presence of
correlated eavesdropper’s observations. We evaluate this bound
with our experimental gain measurements to show that operating
with a finite number of samples incurs a loss in secret-key rate
on the order of 20%.
Index Terms—Key generation, software-defined radios, exper-
imental, finite length, narrowband, channel diversity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications are, by nature, particularly vul-
nerable to eavesdropping and call for carefully designed
encryption mechanisms. So far, the protection of wireless
communications has mainly involved mathematical crypto-
graphic schemes implemented at the upper layers of the
communication stack. Such systems require a secret key (either
private and/or public) to encrypt the data stream, in such
a way that it becomes extremely difficult to decipher the
messages without the key. Mathematical cryptography relies
on mathematical problems that are supposedly difficult to
solve, such as prime number factorization or discrete logarithm
computation. Although these techniques are widespread and
well-tested, some of their current limitations, such as the need
for complex key management, encourage the development of
other mechanisms.
Physical-layer security promises ways of providing secrecy
through the use of the intrinsic randomness present in any
communication medium, such as noise, fading, and inter-
ferences. Physical-layer security techniques can be broadly
divided into two categories. The first set of techniques treats
the communication medium as a noisy channel, with the goal
of communicating messages reliably between legitimate users
and securely with respect to eavesdroppers. Such techniques
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are typically developed from an information-theoretic wiretap
channel model [1] and, when used in wireless channels,
now often involve the introduction of artificial noise through
cooperative jamming [2], [3]. The second set of techniques
views the communication medium as a noisy source, and
aims at extracting secret keys from the channel randomness.
Such techniques are usually designed using an information-
theoretic secret-key agreement model [4], [5], which only
focuses on generation of secret keys without independently of
how they are subsequently used. In this paper we focus on the
experimental implementation of the latter set of physical-layer
security techniques.
As summarized in Table I, several works have already
experimentally investigated the generation of secret keys from
wireless channels. In fact, the gains of wireless channels
provide a natural source of randomness, for which reciprocity
guarantees that legitimate users obtain strongly correlated
channel observations, while diversity ensures that the observa-
tions of a third-party eavesdropper disclose little information
about the legitimate users’ measurements. However, while
these works are often motivated by an information-theoretic
formulation, the information-theoretic modeling is not fully
developed. In particular, we argue that often made assumptions
about the eavesdropper’s statistics, such as the decorrelation
of channel gains at distances larger than half the wavelength,
as well as the use of asymptotic values of secret-key gener-
ation, lead to over-simplifications of the protocols and over-
estimations of the achievable information-theoretic secret-key
rates. Consequently, while canonical theoretical models of
wireless channels have proved incredibly useful to design reli-
able communication systems, their use for the design of secret-
key generation systems requires more care. Similarly, checking
that generated keys pass statistical tests [6]–[9], which have
been primarily designed for mathematical cryptography and
only verify some desirable statistical property of the key, does
not guarantee information-theoretic secrecy.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the practical
effect of eavesdropper’s statistics by implementing a secret-key
generation system from wireless channel gain with software-
defined radios, and by carrying out a careful information-
theoretic analysis. We emphasize that the weakness of pre-
viously reported system lies in the modeling of the source
of randomness, but not in the operation of the subsequent
protocol; therefore, we do not attempt to develop a complete
secret-key generation system and we restrict our experimental
system to the acquisition and processing of randomness for
the channel. As reported in the paper, our analysis allows us
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TABLE I
REVIEW AND COMPARISON OF EXISTING LITERATURE.
Reference Experiments Measurement statistics Security Analysis
[7], [9]–[11] No
Postulated from model or non-applicable
Non information-theoretic
[12]–[14] Simulations
[6], [8], [15], [16]
Yes[17] I(X;Z) = 0 because of decorrelation
[18]–[21] Estimated from experimental measurements Asymptotic information-theoretic
Present paper Yes Estimated from experimental measurements Finite Length
to conclude that (1) assuming that the eavesdropper does not
get any information because of decorrelation with distance is
not exact in a real wireless system and (2) the existence of
a correlated eavesdropper’s observation makes the evaluation
of the finite-length secret-key rates much more intricate. To
the best of our knowledge, and as summarized in Table I, no
previous experimental work has precisely looked into the effect
of eavesdroppers correlated measurements and their effect on
achievable key rates in the finite length regime.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we recall
the basic principles, mathematical formulation, and common
assumptions of secret-key generation from wireless channel
gains. In Section III, we describe the characteristics of our
experimental setup. In Section IV, we assess the robustness of
secret-key generation with respect to the diversity assumption.
In Section V, we develop a theoretical achievable secret-key
rate with a finite number of samples, which we evaluate with
our experimental measurements. Finally, in Section VI, we
present some concluding remarks and we discuss the possible
limitations of the approach.
II. SECRET-KEY GENERATION FROM WIRELESS CHANNEL
GAINS
A. Secret-key generation strategy
The impulse response h(t) of a wireless channel between
two terminals results from the reflections and attenuations
underwent by the transmitted signal along different paths.
We focus on narrowband channels with approximately 1 MHz
bandwidth, for which the received signal is essentially a
delayed version of the original one attenuated by a random
complex gain G(t) exp(φ(t)). This complex gain accounts
for the aggregated effect of attenuation and phase change of
each individual path; note that reciprocity guarantees that the
gain GAB(t) between two points A and B is the same as
the gain GBA(t) between the points B and A. The coherence
time during which the gain G(t) and the phase φ(t) remain
constant scales approximately as Tc ≈ λ/v, where λ is the
wavelength and v is the characteristic speed of the environ-
ment. For instance, in our experimental setup, the objects
around the receiver move at about one meter per second, so
that the coherence time is on the order of milliseconds for
wireless communications at 2.5 GHz. For simplicity, we focus
on the randomness of the channel gain G(t), since precise
Alice's terminal Bob's terminal
Eve's terminal
Legitimate Parties
Eavesdropper
GAB
GBA
GBEGAE
Fig. 1. Experimental measurements of wireless channel gains with software-
defined radios.
measurements of the phase φ(t) require a synchronization of
the terminals beyond the capability of our hardware.
Following common practice, and as illustrated in Fig. 1, we
measure the channel gains between two legitimate terminals
in Time-Division-Duplex mode as follows. We assume that
the first terminal, Alice, sends a complex probe signal b(t)
with unit energy, whose duration β is much smaller than the
coherence time Tc, so that the channel gain G remains almost
constant over the pulse duration. The second terminal, Bob,
measures from the channel a delayed and faded version b˜(t) of
b(t). Using his knowledge of the probe signal, Bobs matches
~b(t) = b˜(t+ Td) and b(t) as
Td = argmaxτ (~b ∗ b)(τ). (1)
Then, Bob estimates the channel gain from Alice to Bob as
GAB =
∫
β
∣∣∣~b(t)∣∣∣2 dt, (2)
by measuring the energy of the delayed received probe signal.
Simultaneously, an eavesdropper, Eve, obtains a channel gain
GAE . Alice estimates the channel gain GBA in a similar
fashion from Bob’s probe signal, which also provides Eve with
a channel gain GBE in the process.
Once n measurements are performed, Alice, Bob, and
Eve, effectively observe the components of a noisy source
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(XnYnZn, pXnY nZn), in which Xn consists of n channel
gains GnBA, Y
n consists of the channel gain GnAB , and Z
n
consists of both sequences GnAE and G
n
BE . A secret-key gen-
eration strategy Sn for the source (XnYnZn, pXnY nZn) with
unlimited public communications consists of the following
operations:
• Reconciliation: Alice transmits a public message F over
the public authenticated channel, which allows Bob to
construct an estimate Xˆn of Xnfrom Y n and F ;
• Privacy amplification: Alice chooses a function G uni-
formly at random in a family of universal2 hash functions,
which is disclosed to all parties. Alice then computes
G(Xn) ∈ K while Bob computes G(Xˆn). Setting K ,J1, 2nRK, R is called the secret-key rate.
In principle, Alice and Bob could interactively exchange
messages, but we restrict the strategy to unidirectional oper-
ation. The secret-key generation strategy Sn must ensure the
following:
1) reliability, measured with the probability of disagree-
ment
Pd(Sn) , P(K 6= Kˆ|Sn);
2) (strong) secrecy, measured by the leakage
L(Sn) , I(K;ZnF |Sn);
3) (strong) uniformity, measured by
U(Sn) , log
⌈
2nR
⌉−H(K|Sn).
Computing the aforementioned metrics requires the knowledge
of source statistics, including that of the eavesdropper.
A secret-key rate R , 1n log |K| is achievable if the three
above metrics tend to zero as n goes to infinity, and the
supremum of achievable secret-key rates is called the secret-
key capacity Cs. Most recent works have focused on the
calculation of Cs, which is an asymptotic limit obtained for
infinitely many realizations of the source; in contrast, the
analysis conducted in Section V focuses on a finite length
behavior that only requires L(Sn) and U(Sn) to be small but
non-zero.
B. Assumptions behind the secret-key generation model
The secrecy guaranteed by a secret-key generation strategy
rely on three common assumptions.
a) Availability of an authenticated public channel of
unlimited capacity: This assumption is not unreasonable if
we aim at generating low secret-key rates for which the
amount of public communication is negligible compared to the
channel capacity. If one explicitly introduces a rate limitation,
reconciliation with vector quantization can be used [22], [23]
without fundamentally affecting the operation of the secret-key
agreement strategy.
b) Existence of enough randomness: Mobility in the
environment is required to ensure that wireless channel gains
have enough entropy. Mobility results from the movements of
objects around the terminals or the terminals themselves; in
indoor wireless environments, this channel gains experience
variability as soon as people move around the communication
terminals.
Binary File
(Probe) Mapping
Raised 
Cosine 
Filter
Gain USRP
BIT
1 bit
COMPLEX
14 bits
COMPLEX
14 bits
COMPLEX
14 bits
BINARY
{0,1}
BPSK
{-1,1}
Post 
Processing
Channel
Gain 
Estimation
AGCUSRP
COMPLEX
12 bits
COMPLEX
12 bits
COMPLEX
12 bits
PLL
COMPLEX
12 bits
Computed from the 
probe signal
Transmission
Reception
Fig. 2. Communication chain for channel gain estimation
c) Knowledge of eavesdropper’s statistics: In an
information-theoretic secret-key generation model, one re-
quires the knowledge of the statistical dependencies between
Eve’s observations and the legitimate users’ to assess the
secrecy of the keys. Unfortunately, there exists no indirect way
to estimate these statistical dependencies of the eavesdropper
without performing measurements at Eve’s terminal position.
In addition, as pointed out in [6], the statistics should not
be influenced by the eavesdropper to prevent the induction of
artificial deterministic and predictable variations of the channel
parameters.
The knowledge of the eavesdropper’s statistics is the most
crucial assumption for the proper operation of a secret-
key generation system. This could be avoided by operating
in a quantum setting, e.g. [24], but to the best of our
knowledge such systems are only efficiently implemented in
optics. In the classical wireless setting, the assumption is
often circumvented by assuming that exists enough diver-
sity in the environment, so that one can either assume that
I (GAB ;GAEGBE) = 0 meaning the eavesdropper’s observa-
tions are completely independent of the legitimate users’, or,
at least, that I (GAB ;GAEGBE) is upper bounded. However,
we argue that this must be done with great care, and that
it is crucial to precisely assess under which conditions the
diversity assumption may hold, so as to define situations in
which secret keys can be safely generated. Moreover, assuming
that I (GAB ;GAEGBE) = 0 and that the eavesdropper only
observes public communication makes it considerably easier to
analyze secrecy. Privacy amplification and reconciliation are
simply linked using the result of Cachin and Maurer [25],
and counting the number of bits disclosed during privacy
amplification is sufficient to establish the final key length. In
contrast, when I (GAB ;GAEGBE) 6= 0, the final secret key
length depends on the eavesdropper’s statistics and one must
factor in the effect of statistical deviations from the mean when
using a finite number of samples n.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND MEASUREMENTS
In this section, we describe our experimental setup and our
procedure to characterize the statistics of the wireless channel
gains.
A. Experimental setup
The experiments are conducted using the first generation
of USRP designed by Ettus ResearchTM. We use XCVR2450
4 SUBMITTED TO THE IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
1
2
3
Time (s)
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
C
ha
nn
el
G
ai
n
(a
.u
.)
GAB GBA GAE GBE
Fig. 3. Channel gain measurements
daughterboards that operate in the 2.5 GHz and 5 GHz bands,
typically used for WiFi communications. The bandwidth of
the RF front-end is limited to 8 MHz, which is well below
the 20 MHz of bandwidth required by IEEE standards. Con-
sequently, the key rates reported in the remaining of the paper
are likely to be smaller than what could be obtained on top
of an actual IEEE802.11 transmission; however, this does
not affect our methodology and conclusions. RF signals are
transmitted using standard WiFi antennas with a transmission
power below 100 mW. The experiments are conducted in two
ordinary office rooms representative of an indoor environment:
one is our wireless communication laboratory and the other is
a conference room. The choice of which room we used in our
various experiments was only motivated by convenience.
For convenience, all software-defined radios have the same
configuration, both in hardware and software, and all are
connected to a single computer that processes the transmitted
and received data streams. We allow ourselves this simpli-
fication because our focus is only to study the effect of
eavesdropper’s statistics; while this is not exactly how a true
secret-key agreement scheme would operate, we note that syn-
chronization could be achieved in a distributed manner thanks
to the pilot symbols used for channel gain measurements.
The first samples of every data stream are used to calibrate
the measurements and compensate hardware discrepancies by
scaling all measurements to obtain the same average received
energy; after calibration, the scaling is kept constant through
each experiment, as we did not observe any significant drift
during acquisition.
We conducted all experiments using the three-user setup
represented in Fig. 1. We used a modulation frequency of
2.484 GHz, which corresponds to an unused WLAN channel
to avoid interference with other WiFi channels. As the vast
majority of communication systems [26], the XCVR2450
daughterboards are limited to half-duplex operation and we
were unable to simultaneously measure all the channel gains.
We circumvented the problem by continually commuting the
radios between the Rx and Tx modes but, because of further
hardware restrictions, we could not reliably use commutation
times shorter than 80 ms. Consequently, we moved objects
in the environment at less than 1 m.s-1 so that the channel
gain would not vary much between an Rx/Tx switch, hence
maintaining channel reciprocity. If the hardware allowed faster
commutation to capture faster fades, higher secret-key gener-
ation rates would be achieved in a high mobility environment,
but the security analysis would remain essentially the same.
The estimation of the channel gains is performed using
a probe message sent through the communication chain de-
scribed in Fig. 2. The gain present in the transmission chain
allows power control and is kept constant throughout the
entire duration of the experiment. During reception, the USRP
performs demodulation and analog-to-digital conversion. An
AGC (automatic gain controller) scales the received signal to
match the optimal range of the subsequent processing block.
Note that it is tuned to be slow enough not to remove the gain
variations over the timescale of interest. Because the system
operates at a high carrier frequency, we use a phase-locked
loop (PLL) to suppress any residual modulation resulting
from minor differences between modulation and demodulation
frequencies. The demodulated signal is then used to compute
the transmission gain. Note that the probe signal is known
to all parties and that the transmission chain behavior is
entirely deterministic, so that all users also know the shaped
signal and can compute the channel gain. The probe signal,
which is a fixed randomly-generated sequence, is also used to
synchronize the different radios in software.
B. Characterization of channel gain statistics
We now describe our methodology to characterize the statis-
tics of the wireless channel gains for secret-key generation.
The results we report next have been obtained for a fixed
configuration of the terminals similar to that illustrated in
Fig. 1, in which Alice and Bob’s terminals were separated by
1.5m and Eve’s terminal was approximately 1m away from
both Alice and Bob, and based on 500 gain measurement
experiments, each lasting approximately ten seconds. Fig. 3
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the statistical dependence between channel gains
shows a snapshot of the evolution of the various channels gains
between Alice, Bob, and Eve. As could have been expected
from reciprocity, GAB closely follows GBA. Eve’s channels
gains GAE and GBE are seemingly unrelated to the channel
gains GAB and GBA, potentially confirming the existence
of enough channel diversity. According to Jake’s model [],
diversity should hold as soon as Eve is farther from Alice
and Bob than the coherence distance, which is `c = λ/2 ≈
6 cm, at 2.484 GHz; in the next section, we perform a more
careful diversity analysis and show that this us unfortunately
not accurate enough for secret-key generation.
To make the statistical characterization tractable, it is de-
sirable to operate on a memoryless source of randomness
for which two consecutive observations are independent. We
thus need to downsample the raw measurements in Fig. 3 to
remove the time correlation and only keep a single sample
per coherence interval; since the coherence time is on the
order of magnitude of λ/v, we expect Tc to be on the order
of one second. We obtain a more precise characterization of
the value of Tc with an estimation of the mutual information
I(X0;Xν) between a sample X0 and the ν-th next sample Xν ,
obtained by viewing each of our experimental time series as
the realization of the same ergodic random process. The lower
I(X0;Xν) is, the less dependent the samples are. To use more
samples for the estimation, we also assumed that the gains
were wide sense stationary, which we confirmed by verifying
that the quantity I(X0;Xν) remained the same for different
choices of X0. Unless mentioned otherwise, all information
metrics are estimated with the technique presented in [27].
As shown in Fig. 4, the mutual information I(X0;Xν) decays
rapidly and vanishes after a dozen samples, corresponding to
approximately one second, as expected. We note that operating
on the down-sampled measurements instead of the original
measurements would result in a lower achievable secret-key
rate, which might seem an unnecessary simplification since
we know how to characterize achievable secret-key rates for
sources with memory [12], [28]. However, without an accurate
parametric model, the estimation of the statistics of a source
with memory turns out to be a much more difficult problem.
The final step is then to estimate the joint statistics pXY Z
of the memoryless source, which poses two challenges. First,
one would in principle need to analyze the estimation error
and include it in the subsequent calculation of achievable key
rates; in this paper, we do not take this into account and
assume that our estimation is accurate enough to be used
as the true joint statistics. Second, our measurements only
provide us access to quantized measurements XQ, YQ and
ZQ of the true channel gains X , Y , and Z, respectively. The
quantization of X and Y is not critical, since the effect is
merely to reduce achievable secret-key rates and to affect the
reconciliation step. However, the quantization of Z results
in an underestimation of the eavesdropper’s knowledge, and
we need to assume that the eavesdropper is able to keep
Z continuous. Consequently, we need to estimate the joint
statistics pXQYQZ . Since we cannot acquire a continuous-
valued Z with the software-defined radios, we first construct
a histogram corresponding to pXQYQZQ′ from the measured
data, where ZQ′ is a quantized version of Z. To obtain
pXQYQZ , we then perform an interpolation of the histogram
with respect to Z ′Q. The raw data was acquired with a 14
bits resolution, which we further quantized to obtain a 4-bit
resolution for XQ and YQ, and a 6.5-bit resolution for ZQ′ .
The estimation process could be further refined, but is left for
future research.
IV. ROBUSTNESS OF THE DIVERSITY ASSUMPTION
To verify to what extent the diversity assumption holds
in a narrowband wireless setting, we conducted a series of
measurements in our building conference room. The room
is about 40 squared meters and is furnished as shown in
Fig. 5. Experiments were conducted off-hours to avoid any
unwanted motion outside of the room. Two software-defined
radios were placed in the middle of the room on the conference
table, two meters apart. We used a third radio to represent the
eavesdropper, which was then moved in the room across 60
possible positions. We measured the channel gains GAB and
GAE obtained by Bob and Eve to evaluate I (GAB , GBE).
These experiments only involved one way communications
(Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve), thus avoiding the problem
of half-duplex operation and allowing us to gather data at a
faster pace. Each experiment lasted one minute, during which
we acquired 50,000 channels gain values at a 1 kHz sampling
rate.
The results of the measurement campaign are presented in
Figures 5 and 6. Eve is placed across the positions indicated
by the black ”+” marks, which correspond to a coarse square
grid of one meter and additional positions to cover interesting
spots and the room borders. The brightness represents the
normalized secrecy-rate (supposing GAB = GBA) between
the gains obtained by Eve and those obtained by Bob, which
is computed as
Normalized secrecy-rate , I (GAB ;GBA)− I (GAB ;GAE)
I (GAB ;GBA)
= 1− I (GAB ;GAE)
H (GAB)
, (3)
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Fig. 5. Measurements of the normalized secrecy-rate without motion
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Fig. 6. Measurements of the normalized secrecy-rate with motion
where GAB and GAE are the channel gains measured by
Bob and Eve, respectively. We introduce this normalization
to compensate the entropy variations of the wireless channel
gains across different experiments. This quantity is close to
one (white) when the gains are independent, and equal to zero
(black) when there is a one-to one mapping between GAB and
GAE .
The first series of measurement shown in Fig. 5 is conducted
without movement and serves as a benchmark. In this situation,
there is no fluctuation of the channel gains, except those
induced by the noise at the receivers’ terminals. Therefore,
the quantity I (GAB ;GAE) is small since the receiver noise is
independent from one radio to another. When Eve and Alice
use the same antenna, we obtain a darker spot since we create
an electronic coupling between the terminals.
From a secret-key generation standpoint, we need to intro-
duce motion to induce variations of the channel gains. In a
second series of measurement shown in Fig. 6, the operator
is walking in the upper left corner of the room. We observed
high correlations when Bob and Eve’s antennas are huddled
together, and a fast decay of this correlation with distance,
with leaked information reaching almost zero after a few
centimeters. However, we observe that the leaked information
increased again further away, even reaching values as high as
10% in the upper left corner. Since this corner was actually the
place where the operator was moving during the experiment,
it suggests that measurements close to the motion source
provide a better insight into the legitimate channel fluctuations.
Therefore, defining a simple zone of guaranteed secrecy for
key generation is not straightforward. From a security stand-
point this clearly shows that we cannot ignore the information
leaked to the eavesdropper when channel variations come from
the motion in the environment. It shows that a secret key
generation must include a stage of privacy amplification to
deal with unforeseeable levels of leaked information.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SECRET-KEY GENERATION IN THE
FINITE BLOCK-LENGTH REGIME
Once the statistics pXQYQZ of the source are characterized,
one can easily calculate asymptotic achievable secret-key rates
I (XQ;YQ)− I (XQ;Z). However, these rates may be far too
optimistic when operating on a finite number of samples, and
it is crucial to avoid overestimating the number of secret
bits that one can effectively extract with reconciliation and
privacy amplification. Our analysis in Section V-A is based
on the detailed study of privacy amplification with continuos
eavesdropper’s observation, which differs from the finite-
length analysis in [29], [30] restricted to discrete observations.
Our numerical results in Section V-B are also obtained for the
memoryless source pXQYQZ characterized experimentally in
Section III, and not from computer simulations. We emphasize
that the only approximation in our analysis is that the source
statistics estimated in Section III-B correspond to the true
statistics; the entire analysis in Section V-A is exact.
A. Finite-length analysis of privacy amplification for a con-
tinuous observation Z
We now analyze a sequential strategy [31], [32], in which
the reconciliation step is performed with error correction
codes, such as [33], and the privacy amplification step is
performed with universal2 hash functions [34]. The major
technical challenge is that Z is continuous, so that it is not
possible to directly use previous approaches [31], [34], which
are only valid for discrete random variables. In principle, we
could quantize Z, since by [35] [36] [37, Section 8.5] [38,
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Lemma 2] [23, Lemma 1.2], for any δ > 0, if a quantized
version ZQ′ of Z is fine enough, we have
|I(K;AZ)− I(K;FZQ′)| < δ.
Unfortunately, this result is only useful asymptotically since
we do not know how to relate a fixed quantized version ZQ′ to
δ. We circumvent the problem using the notion of continuous
strong typicality [39], and we refer the reader to Appendix A
for all notation and definitions related to continuous strong
typicality.
We assume that reconciliation is performed on XQ and YQ,
and we define Prece as the probability of error of the reconcil-
iation step, and lrec as the number of information bits leaked
during the process. To determine the final secret-key length
obtained after privacy amplification with a universal2 hash
function G chosen at random, we lower bound H(K|GZnF ),
which represents the uncertainty on the key the eavesdropper
gets with its own observation Zn, the knowledge of G, and
the public message F . We first lower bound the Re´nyi entropy
Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn, F = frec) [34] by a term that can be
numerically evaluated, and then apply [32, Theorem 4.4]. Our
analysis relies on two technical lemmas. Lemma 1 shows that
the Re´nyi entropy Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn) is lower-bounded by
the Shannon entropy nH(XQ|Z) and a carefully characterized
term that vanishes as n goes to infinity. Lemma 2 relates
Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn) to Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn, F = frec).
Lemma 1 (Adapted from [31] [32]). Consider a memoryless
source (XQZ, pXZ) with XQ a discrete alphabet and Z a
continuous alphabet. Consider A(n),′(Z,XQ), as defined in
Appendix A, where ′ is fixed and chosen such that
∃n0 ∈ N,∀n > n0,
2∑
i=1
(
enC
(i)
Z (
′) + e
nC
(i)
ZXQ
(′)
)
6 2−b1n.
(4)
Define
Θ , 1
{
(Zn, XnQ) ∈ A(n),′(Z,XQ) and Zn ∈ B(n),′(Z,XQ)
}
,
where
B(n),′(Z,XQ) ,{
zn : P
[(
A(n),′(Z,XQ)
)c ∣∣∣Zn = zn] 6 2−nb0} .
Then, for n > n0,
P[Θ = 1] > 1− δ(1) (n),
where δ(1) (n) ,
∑2
i=1 e
nC
(i)
Z () +2−nb1+2−n(b1−b0). More-
over, for zn ∈ B(n),′(Z,XQ),
Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1) >
n(H(XQ|Z)− − ′) + log2(1− δ(2) (n)),
with δ(2) (n) , 2−nb0.
Proof: See Appendix B
Lemma 2 ( [31], [32]). Let S ∈ S and U ∈ U be two discrete
random variables with joint distribution pSU . Let f ∈ RN.
Define the function Υ : U 7→ {0, 1} as
Υ(u) , 1 {Hc(S)−Hc(S|u) 6 log |U|+ 2f(n) + 2} .
Then, PU [Υ(U) = 1] > 1− 2−f(n).
We are now ready to develop the finite length analysis. Let
b0 > 0, b1 > b0,  > 0, and f(n), g(n) ∈ RN. We define
Θ , 1
{
(Zn, XnQ) ∈ A(n),′(Z,XQ) and Zn ∈ B(n),′(Z,XQ)
}
,
Υ , 1
{
Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1)
−Hc(Xn|Zn = zn,Θ = 1, F = frec)
6 log |F|+ 2f(n) + 2}.
By Lemmas 1 and 2, P(Υ = 1,Θ = 1) > 1 − δ(3),f (n), with
δ
(3)
,f (n) , 2−f(n) + δ
(1)
 (n) and
H(K|GZnF ) >
(
1− δ(3),f (n)
)
H(K|GZnF,Υ = 1,Θ = 1).
(5)
To lower bound H(K|GZnF,Υ = 1,Θ = 1), we lower bound
Hc(XN |Zn = zn, F = frec,Θ = 1,Υ = 1) for any zn ∈
B(n),′(Z,XQ) by means of Lemmas 1 and 2, and use [32,
Theorem 4.4] [34]. By definition of Υ,
Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn, F = frec,Θ = 1,Υ = 1)
> Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1)− log |F| − 2f(n)− 2
(∗)
> k˜, (6)
where (∗) follows from Lemma 1, with
k˜ , n(H(XQ|Z)−−′)+log2(1−δ(2) (n))−lrec−2f(n)−2.
We set k¯ ,
⌊
k˜ − g(n)
⌋
, and, by [32, Theorem 4.4] [34] and
(6), we obtain
H(K|G,Zn = zn, F = frec,Υ = 1,Θ = 1) > k¯ − δ(4)g (n),
(7)
with δ(4)g (n) , log
(
1 + 2−g(n)
)
. Then, by (5) and (7)
H(K|GZnF ) >
(
1− δ(3),f (n)
)(
k¯ − δ(4)g (n)
)
.
To summarize, we obtain
Pe 6 Prece , Ue 6 δ
(5)
,f,g(n), Le 6 δ
(5)
,f,g(n),
k¯(, ′, b0, b1, f, g)
,
⌊
n(H(XQ|Z)− − ′) + log2(1− δ(2) (n))
− lrec − 2f(n)− g(n)− 2
⌋
,
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with
δ(1) (n) ,
2∑
i=1
enC
(i)
Z () + 2−nb1 + 2−n(b1−b0),
δ(2) (n) , 2−nb0,
δ
(3)
,f (n) , 2−f(n) + δ(1) (n),
δ(4)g (n) , log2
(
1 + 2−g(n)
)
,
δ
(5)
,f,g(n) , δ
(3)
,f (n)
(
k − δ(4)g (n)
)
+ δ(4)g (n).
Recall that (XQZ, pXQZ) is a memoryless source with XQ
discrete and Z continuous with known statistics. For fixed
L > 0, U > 0, and block-length n, sequential secret-key
generation with privacy amplification performed with universal
hash function therefore ensures L < L, U < U and Pd 6
Prec, while achieving the following generated secret-key length
k , sup
(,′,b0,b1,f,g)∈C(L,U )
k¯(, ′, b0, b1, f, g), (8)
where
C(L, U ) ,
{
(, ′, b0, b1, f, g) ∈ [0, 1]4 × RN+ × RN+ :
∃n0,∀n > n0,
2∑
i=1
(
enC
(i)
Z (
′) + e
nC
(i)
ZXQ
(′)
)
6 2−b1n,
b1 > b0, f(n) = o(n), g(n) = o(n), δ
(5)
,f,g(n) 6 min(L, U )
}
.
Note that, asymptotically, the corresponding achievable key
rate is Rlow , I(XQ;YQ)−I(XQ;Z), which is a lower bound
of the secret-key capacity Cs [5].
B. Numerical results
We now use the experimental measurements in Section III to
evaluate our achievable bound in (8). Without losing general-
ity, and to separate the finite length effect of reconciliation and
privacy amplification, we also assume that the reconciliation
has efficiency β ∈ [0, 1] (see [32]) so that lrec = n(H(X) −
βI(X;Y )) bits are leaked to the eavesdropper. The best case
scenario, obtained for β = 1, would yield H(X|Y ) bits leaked
during the reconciliation step. Next, to compute the key length,
we estimated the quantities
H(XQ|Z), C(i)Z (), C(i)ZXQ(),
for some  > 0 and i ∈ J1, 2K. We then numerically optimized
an estimate of k in (8) for which U < 10−3, L < 10−3,
by testing a large range of parameter values (, ′, b0, b1, f, g),
where f and g are taken of the form f(n) , n−α1 , g(n) ,
n−α2 , with n ∈ N, α1 > 0 and α2 > 0. Note that, to ensure the
first constraint in C(L, U ), we guarantee instead the sufficient
condition 4 exp [nCmax] 6 2−b1n, i.e., n(Cmax + b1 ln 2) +
2 ln 2 6 0, where Cmax , maxi∈J1,2K (C(i)Z (′), C(i)ZXQ(′)).
The key rates are finally reported in Fig. 7 in terms of the
ratio η of the finite-length key rate to the asymptotic key-rate
defined as
η , k/n
Rlow
,
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Block-length n
R
at
io
η
β = 1
β = 0.95
β = 0.90
β = 0.85
β = 0.80
Fig. 7. Ratio η, for U < 10−3 and L < 10−3
TABLE II
PARAMETERS FOR THE VALUES OF η ON FIGURE 7
n

′
b1
b0
α1
α2
1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000
0.2590 0.1840 0.1199 0.0900 0.0625 0.0410
0.3019 0.2034 0.1286 0.0912 0.0653 0.0407
0.1000 0.0660 0.0420 0.0289 0.0220 0.0140
0.0100 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010
0.4400 0.4200 0.3800 0.3500 0.3300 0.3100
0.4400 0.4200 0.3800 0.3500 0.3300 0.3100
where Rs = I (XQ;YQ) − I (XQ;Z). For our specific statis-
tics pXQYQZ , we have Rs ≈ 1.46 bits.1 The corresponding
values of the parameters (, ′, b0, b1, f, g) are also reported in
Table II.
Fig. 7 shows that the achievable secret-key rates may be
much lower than the upper bound Rlow in the finite block-
length regime. For instance, even if the reconciliation protocol
has an efficiency of 90% for n =30,000, the actual achievable
secret-key rate is 20% lower than Rlow as shown in Fig. 7.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The main weakness of secret-key generation from wireless
channel gains is the difficulty to clearly establish conditions
for secrecy without a precise knowledge of the eavesdropper’s
statistics. Our experiments show that there exists no simple
relationship between the eavesdropper’s proximity and the
correlation of its observations in a typical indoor environment,
which suggests that traditional parametric models of wireless
channels should be used with great care. Furthermore, even if
characterizing the wireless environment is possible, a precise
estimation of the source statistics is a challenge in itself,
which has a non-negligible effect on the estimation of actual
achievable key-rates and the operation of privacy amplification
with a finite number of samples.
1Note that Rs is only an achievable key rate. The secret-key capacity Cs
is only know to satisfy Cs 6 I(X;Y |Z) ≈ 1.76 bits.
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To address this weakness, several solutions are worth in-
vestigating. First, one might want to restrict the use of secret-
key generation schemes to situations in which the channel
gains possess more entropy, and in which an eavesdropper’s
measurements would exhibit less statistical dependence. As
suggested by the results in [19], [40], high-mobility envi-
ronment might be more suitable, and one might consider
exploiting the phase of the complex channel gain instead of
the magnitude. However, exploiting the phase is technically
more challenging, and would require precise synchronization
between terminals. Second, one might want to turn to channel
models for secret-key generation [4], in which a legitimate
terminal injects artificial noise in the channel, combined with
multiple antennas. In particular, the results of [41], [42] sug-
gest that one can get away with a mere assumption regarding
the number of antennas of the eavesdropper, which completely
removes the need for the intricate eavesdropper’s statistics
estimation.
APPENDIX A
CONTINUOUS TYPICALITY
This section is adapted from [39].
Let X , Y be two discrete or continuous alphabets. Let b0 >
0, b1 > b0 and  > 0. Let n ∈ N. Let {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 be
i.i.d. random variables drawn according to the joint distribution
pXY . Define
f(xn) ,
∣∣∣∣− 1n log p(xn)−H(X)
∣∣∣∣ ,
f(yn) ,
∣∣∣∣− 1n log p(yn)−H(Y )
∣∣∣∣ ,
f(xn, yn) ,
∣∣∣∣− 1n log p(xn, yn)−H(X,Y )
∣∣∣∣ ,
where H denotes either the discrete entropy H or the differ-
ential entropy h. Define
A(n),′(X,Y ) ,
{
(xn, yn) ∈ Xn × Yn :
f(xn) 6 , f(yn) 6 ′, f(xn, yn) 6 ′
}
,
where ′ is such that2
∃n0,∀n > n0,P [f(Y n) > ′ or f(Xn, Y n) > ′] 6 2−nb1.
Remark. Note that ′ is a function of  and is not uniquely
defined for a fixed .
Define
Â(n),′(X,Y ) ,
{
(xn, yn) ∈ A(n),′(X,Y ) :
P
[(
A(n),′(X,Y )
)c ∣∣∣∣Xn = xn] 6 2−nb0
}
,
2 Because we want to numerically compute ′, we do not do the better
choice
′ , (1 + ) inf
{
′′ > 0 :
∃n0, ∀n > n0,P
[
f(Y n) > ′′ or f(Xn, Y n) > ′′
]
6 2−b1N
}
,
as in [39].
with
P
[(
A(n),′(X,Y )
)c ∣∣∣∣Xn = xn] , ∑
yn:(xn,yn)/∈A(n)
,′
p(yn|xn).
Define
C
(1)
X () , mins>0
(
lnE[p(X)−s/ ln 2]− s(H(X) + )
)
,
C
(2)
X () , mins>0
(
lnE[p(X)s/ ln 2]− s(−H(X) + )
)
.
We similarly define C(i)Y () and C
(i)
XY () for i ∈ J1, 2K.
Remark. For i ∈ J1, 2K, the expression C(i)X (), C(i)Y () and
C
(i)
XY () can be specified. For instance, in C
(1)
X (),
s0 , argmins>0
(
lnE[p(X)−s/ ln 2]− s(H(X) + )
)
,
is such that
1
ln 2
E[−p(X)−s0/ ln 2 log p(X)]
E[p(X)−s0/ ln 2]
= H(X) + .
Lemma 3 (Adapted from [39]). Consider A(n),′(X,Y ), where
′ is fixed and chosen such that
∃n0,∀n > n0,
2∑
i=1
(
enC
(i)
Y (
′) + enC
(i)
XY (
′)
)
6 2−b1n.
1) Let (xn, yn) ∈ A(n),′(X,Y ).
p(yn|xn) 6 2−n(H(Y |X)−′−),
2) Let n > n0.
P
[(
A(n),′(X,Y )
)c]
6
2∑
i=1
enC
(i)
X () + 2−nb1,
3) Let n > n0.
P
[(
Â(n) (X,Y )
)c]
6
2∑
i=1
enC
(i)
X ()+2−nb1+2−n(b1−b0).
Proof: We first need to verify that ′ is well defined.
By Chernoff’s bound, applied to {− log p(Xi)}ni=1, and
{log p(Xi)}ni=1, we obtain
P
[
− 1
N
log p(Xn) > H(X) + 
]
6 enC
(1)
X (),
and
P
[
1
N
log p(Xn) > −H(X) + 
]
6 enC
(2)
X ().
Hence, by the union bound
P [f(Xn) > ] 6
2∑
i=1
enC
(i)
X ().
Similarly,
P [f(Y n) > ] 6
2∑
i=1
enC
(i)
Y (),
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P [f(Xn, Y n) > ] 6
2∑
i=1
enC
(i)
XY (),
Hence, ′ is well defined.
1) Let (xn, yn) ∈ A(n),′(X,Y ).
By definition of A(n),′(X,Y ), we have
p(xn) > 2−n(H(X)+),
p(xn, yn) 6 2−n(H(XY )−′),
hence
p(yn|xn) = p(x
n, yn)
p(xn)
6 2−n(H(Y |X)−′−).
2) Let n > n0. By the union bound and the definition of
′,
P
[(
A(n),′(X,Y )
)c]
6 P [f(Xn) > ]
+ P[f(Y n) > ′ or f(Xn, Y n) > ′]
6
2∑
i=1
enC
(i)
X () + 2−nb1.
3) Let n > n0. Define
Cn ,
{
xn ∈ Xn : f(xn) 6 ,
P
[(
A(n),′(X,Y )
)c ∣∣∣∣Xn = xn] > 2−nb0
}
,
such that
P
[(
Â(n),′(X,Y )
)c]
− P
[(
A(n),′(X,Y )
)c]
= P
[{
(xn, yn) ∈ A(n),′(X,Y ) : xn ∈ Cn
}]
=
∑
xn∈Cn
p(xn)P
[
A(n),′(X,Y )
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn]
6
∑
xn∈Cn
p(xn)
(a)
6 2nb0
∑
xn∈Cn
p(xn)×
P
[
f(Y n) > ′ or f(Xn, Y n) > ′
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn]
6 2nb0
∑
xn∈Xn
p(xn)×
P
[
f(Y n) > ′ or f(Xn, Y n) > ′
∣∣∣∣Xn = xn]
(b)
6 2−n(b1−b0),
where (a) holds by definition of Cn and (b) holds by
definition of ′.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Let zn ∈ B(n),′(Z,XQ). By Lemma 3 in Appendix A , we
have P[Θ = 1] > P
[
Â(n),′(Z,XQ)
]
> 1 − δ(1) (n). Then, by
Bayes’ rule,
P(XnQ = xnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1)
=
P[Θ = 1|XnQ = xnQ, Zn = zn]P(XnQ = xnQ|Zn = zn)
P[Θ = 1|Zn = zn] .
(9)
We have by definition of Θ
P[Θ = 1|Zn = zn] = P
(
A(n),′(Z,XQ)|Zn = zn
)
> 1− 2−nb0
= 1− δ(2) (n). (10)
We also have by Lemma 3.1
P(XnQ = xnQ|Zn = zn) 6 2−n(H(XQ|Z)−−
′), (11)
for (xnQ, z
n) satisfying P[Θ = 1|XnQ = xnQ, Zn = zn] > 0.
Hence, by (10) and (11), (9) gives
P(XnQ = xnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1) 6
2−n(H(XQ|Z)−−
′)
1− δ(2) (n)
.
Finally,
Hc(XnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1)
> H∞(XnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1)
= − log2 max
xnQ
P(XnQ = xnQ|Zn = zn,Θ = 1)
> n(H(XQ|Z)− − ′) + log2(1− δ(2) (n)).
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